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1. Introduction 
 
“Business is business. We try to separate politics from business … I think the internal 
situation in the Sudan is an internal affair.” 
Zhou Wenzhong, Deputy Foreign Minister of China 1 
 
“On 9 July 2011 South Sudan became the newest country in the world.” Thus titles the 
United Nation Peacekeeping section of the UNMISS, the United Nation Mission in 
Southern Sudan. After two decades of civil war between the North and the South, the 
referendum for the foundation of the Republic of South Sudan was adopted with 99 % of 
the votes. The vote was recognized by over 25 states of the international community, 
including all permanent members of the UN Security Council and on 14 July 2011 South 
Sudan was welcomed as 193rd member to the United Nations by Secretary General Ban Ki 
Moon.2  In 2005, Sudan and South Sudan ended over 20 years of fighting by signing the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) which was also preparing the vote for a possible 
secession of the South. However, both the CPA and the independence do not mean that 
Sudan and South Sudan are at peace. First of all, the conflicts which prevail within and 
between North and South will be continued on a political stage.3 Second of all, North-
South border conflicts as well as the humanitarian crisis in the western region of Darfur 
remain unsolved.  
The complex and long-lasting conflicts in Sudan have been and remain under scrutiny and 
special attention of the world. Sudan is amongst the top 10 oil producing countries on the 
African continent. In the light of troubles in the Middle East, African countries become a 
viable alternative for the traditional big players in the global oil market but also for the 
newcomers to secure resource demands. New actors on the global oil market, such as 
China or India, seek spaces in Africa that are not yet occupied by the big oil players.  In 
                                                 
1 Taylor 2006, 950.  
2 United States Secretary General, Department of Public Information. "On Eve of Welcoming South Sudan to 
United Nations, Secretary General Tells Security Council 'A Viable South Will Need a Viable North - And 
Vice Versa'." SG/SM/13701 SC/10324 AFR/2210 13 07 2011: 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sgsm13701.doc.htm, 07/11/13. 
3 Large/Patey 2011, . 
5 
this context, China’s reemergence as big player on the global stage is of special 
importance. In the past three decades China reformed its economy, focusing on economic 
development as one political main priority. The recent steady economic growth of around 
8% in China causes an increased need for resources. While only producing 6% of the 
world’s GDP, China uses 31% of the world’s coal, 30% of iron, 27% of steel, 40% of 
cement, 20% of its copper and 10% of its energy. 4 The Chinese government has to secure 
the growing demand for resources in order to back their recent economic growth and thus 
to secure their political legitimacy.  
The reemergence of China in Africa is of epochal meaning for Africa. China’s presence 
has a profound impact on several levels of life and politics in the African countries it is 
doing business with. China’s diplomacy impacts important aspects of governance5. But it 
also affects the everyday life of people in these countries. For instance, China exports a 
decisive amount of labor force to Africa. In several African countries, children start to 
identify people with light skin as Chinese rather than European.6 China’s aid in form of 
infrastructure and construction has a growing presence in many African countries. 
Likewise, Chinese oil companies are the main oil producers in many African countries. In 
Africa, oil is often connected to conflicts, violence and forced displacement.7 Thus, 
Chinese companies are involved, directly or indirectly, in these conflicts. Therefore, the 
Chinese are not welcome everywhere in Africa and their presence is increasingly watched 
with suspicion and criticism amongst the population of African countries. There are even 
growing numbers of violent incidences and threats against Chinese companies and workers 
in certain African countries.8  
Over the past two decades, China’s involvement in Africa has turned from a rather passive 
supporter to an important economic and political ally for many governments. China’s 
policy towards its African partners developed and deepened significantly since the 1990s.  
                                                 
4 Jiang 2009, 587. 
5 Carmody and Taylor 2009 
6 Carmody 2011, 1. 
7 Askouri 2007.  
8 N.N. „Chinese Worker Abducted in Niger.“ BBC News Online (07/07/07): 
 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6280700.stm, 07/31/13. 
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While China-Africa ties are deepening, several interconnected issues challenge China’s 
non-interference approach. To secure its growing demand of energy and resources, China 
needs to explore resources “off the beaten track”. To get involved in countries where 
Western companies are reluctant to invest has proved to be a successful strategy of creating 
own competitive advantages. While China is on the way to reassuming its historical 
position of being one of the world’s leading economic forces, the West, led by the EU and 
the USA, never misses a chance to voice concerns about the nature of China’s relationship 
to Africa. The aspects of non-interference and respect of sovereignty are the main point of 
criticism for the West for they enable China to engage with regimes regardless of their 
human rights records. China provides aid to and trades with those African countries which 
western countries try to pressure to recognize human rights and democracy through the 
withdrawal of their financial support. The most prominent example for Chinese 
engagement with questionable governments is the case of the Sudan. The dictatorial 
regime of President Omar al-Bashir and clashes between militant groups of both North and 
South are forcing millions of people into refugee camps and international observers 
repeatedly report of human rights violations. A common western criticism accused China 
of supporting the government’s crimes and war through oil investment and the 
proliferation of military equipment. In 2009, China and Sudan celebrated their 50th 
anniversary of diplomatic relations.  For various reasons, China’s relations with Sudan 
have often been used as model to characterize China’s experience in Africa in general. 
Since the 1990s, China’s policy towards Africa changed to a strategic partnership based on 
economic interests and profit making. Key-elements of this strategy are the ‘Five 
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence’, mutual respect for territorial sovereignty and integrity, 
non-aggression, non-interference, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence.9 
The ‘Five Principles’ mark a fundamental difference between Chinese and Western 
engagement in Africa and facilitate connections between China and many African 
governments.  However, while China’s sovereignty doctrine and non-interference policy is 
constantly revoked in official statements of the Chinese government, this policy has 
recently been challenged when it comes to its practical application.  
                                                 
9 Carmody and Taylor 2009.  
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The purpose of this paper will be to find out why and to what extend China’s non-
interference principle has been challenged in Sudan. I will argue that there has been a 
change in China’s sovereignty doctrine in general over the past three decades. While 
China’s stance on sovereignty gradually shifted to more flexibility, other factors, such as 
economic development and, as a consequence of its development strategy, the quest for 
energy security, have come into focus. Meanwhile, China’s growing involvement in the 
international system has increasingly bound China to certain international norms and laws. 
With rising power, China has to negotiate a way between its particular interests and its 
policy agenda while reconciling this with norms of the international system. With growing 
power status, China needs to prove its ability to be a responsible power. Image concerns 
and international status have increasingly influenced China’s foreign policy practices. 
China’s foreign policy is marked by the challenges and contradictions of a reemerging 
economic and political global power. These challenges and contradictions also influence 
China’s foreign policy behavior in Africa. The case of Sudan is exemplary for how these 
factors influence and alter China’s foreign policy behavior.  China’s growing entanglement 
in the politics and economics of its partners force Beijing to adapt its foreign policy 
strategies. Amidst conflict in Darfur, international protest and changes in the political 
realities with the succession of South Sudan, China’s non-interference policy is facing 
multiple challenges.   
China is now the largest investor in Sudanese oil. In media and public discourse, Sudan 
was often evoked as the exemplary case that demonstrated the reckless, profit-oriented, 
inhumane Chinese engagement in Africa. Chinese involvement with the dictatorial regime 
of Omar al-Bashir and the support of the government in Khartoum during the conflict in 
Darfur “gave meaning to China’s role in Sudan”10. But when China changed its stance on 
the Darfur issue and got involved in the deployment of the UN hybrid mission to Darfur, 
Sudan also became the symbol for possibilities of change in China’s Africa policy and the 
questioning of the operationalization of China’s sovereignty doctrine. The deepening of 
ties between China and the governments of both Khartoum and Juba, China’s role in the 
Darfur crisis, as well as China’s engagement in the highly politicized Sudanese oil market 
                                                 
10 Large and Patey 2011, 1. 
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and its role during the 2012 oil fee impasse negotiations challenge the actual credible 
operationalization of the sovereignty doctrine China continues to propagate publicly. China 
is not only concerned with its international reputation but is also increasingly confronted 
with security concerns. Ongoing and renewed conflicts and instability render Chinese 
companies vulnerable. This has increased since groups opposed to the government of 
Khartoum chose the governments allies as target to put pressure on the central government. 
The question of investment protection is of growing importance for China, not only in 
Sudan. This has a decisive impact the actual practice of non-interference. 
The thesis at hand is separated in three main chapters. In the first chapter I will place the 
phenomenon of China’s reemergence as global power in the framework of globalization. I 
will then shortly state the research methods used in this work. I will then continue to 
clarify some terms. 
In the second chapter I will analyze the sources that impact China’s foreign policy 
regarding the concept of sovereignty behind the background of domestic and international 
influences. I will analyze how the concept of sovereignty shifted and was influenced by 
other factors of Chinese foreign policy. 
The third chapter is devoted to the case study of Sino-Sudan-South Sudan relations. 
Drawing on political and economic relation between China and Sudan, conflict and 
changes in Sudan’s political realities, I will analyze why and how China’s non-interference 
policy was challenged. I will then analyze the potentials and limits of the change in 
China’s non-interference policy. 
I will conclude with a summary of my findings and some remarks of the future of Sino-
Sudan relations and the impact China’s experiences can have on Sino-African relations in 
general. 
  
9 
2. China in a global context 
 
In this chapter I will embed the phenomenon of China’s reemergence as super power and 
as important partner in Africa into the framework of globalization to show the relevance of 
the topic in the field of Global Studies. I will then proceed to explain the research 
methodology of this work. I will continue with the clarification of some of the terms used 
throughout this thesis.  
2.1. China rise and Globalization 
For the field of Global Studies, China’s reemergence is of special interest. China’s rise has 
paralleled with the rise of the regime of Globalization and the new global world order. 
While the term globalization is vague and often applied without a fixed definition, the 
actual changes that can be perceived in the world order since the end of the Cold War are 
experienced in different ways by different world regions. 
Before China succumbed to colonialism in the 19th century, the empire has been integrated 
in world trade and historic patterns of globalization. Since the PRC was established in 
1949, Chinese leaders had different ideas about China’s integration in global orders. Mao 
Zedong preferred to shut the countries to the world as much as possible, to rely on self-
sufficiency. In contrast, under his successor, Deng Xiaoping, who introduced 
modernization reforms and a pragmatic approach to economy, China started to open up 
again to the global economy. China today is integrated in the global order due to its 
opening up and going-out strategy. This will require China to integrate the omnipresent 
concept of Globalization. The reemergence of China as economic and political super 
power is challenging existing orders and thus has an important impact on the shifting of 
power-relations in the global order of the 21st Century. However, China’s quest for its new 
position in the world while safeguarding principles such as sovereignty is equally 
challenged and influenced by changing patterns of globalization. 
The first reference to the term globalization (quanqiuhua) by a Chinese official dates back 
to 1996, made by Foreign Minister Qian Qichen before the United Nations General 
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Assembly.11 Since then, the use of the term in Chinese official rhetoric has evolved, 
including not only the economic sphere but also including issues of domestic and foreign 
policy. China is increasingly debating and tackling issues such as nationalism, international 
relations, development, security, energy security, the state and sovereignty behind the 
background of globalization.12 
Not only China’s discourse in increasingly influenced by globalization as a term and 
phenomenon. Globalization has an impact on China’s foreign policy behavior on several 
levels which Thomas G. Moore separates into decisional, institutional and structural 
impacts.13 Chinese foreign policy behavior has not been impacted by globalization on all 
three levels alike. On the institutional level, challenges of China’s economy have increased 
Chinese participation in international economic co-operations such as the WTO. Similarly, 
stronger participation in the global economy and the challenges of globalization impact 
upon the decision-making agenda of China’s leaders.14 However, the “formal structure of 
the foreign policy system remains relatively unchanged.”15  
Arguably, Chinese focus on economic development and security has made globalization an 
important context to understand Chinese foreign policy. The interdependence and 
integration in the global economy has proved to be vital for China’s economic 
development. China remains interested in pursuing its own state interests. However, the 
global economy and increased interdependence has become an important framework for 
China to pursue these interests.16 However, globalization has not completely replaced the 
international distribution of power as an important context to understand China’s foreign 
policy. Globalization is now merely defining “the circumstance within which China 
responds to the international distribution of power”17.18 
                                                 
11 Moore 2005, 123. 
12 Moore 2005, 123-138. 
13 Moore 2005, 142. 
14 Moore 2005, 142-148. 
15 Moore 2005, 144 
16 Moore 2005, 148-151. 
17 Moore 2005, 150. 
18 Moore 2005, 149-152. 
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China is undoubtedly on the rise to regain its status as a great power. Its economic 
development prerogative has increased its interdependence with a wide range of countries. 
China is now a vital link in today’s global order. This is evident on the multilateral level 
where “no military, social demographic or environmental crisis can be adequately 
addressed […] without China’s co-operation, or, at the very least, benevolent 
acquiescence.”19 Therefore, China’s behavior in and towards global governance, i.e. 
regarding “the efforts to tackle issues of global relevance through more or less formalized 
for and institutions that are imbedded within that order”20, either as status quo power or a 
challenge to the global order will be of “greatest relevance for the future of world 
politics.”21 To determine which role China will play, it is again important to look at 
China’s economic development and the resulting integration of China in global economic 
institutions. Likewise, the rise of ‘status’ and international prestige and the influence these 
concepts will have on China’s role in global political governance institutions such as the 
UN Security Council will be vital to determine whether China is a status quo power to the 
global order or poses a challenge to it. While China understands to use institution such as 
the Security Council for its own purpose and the purpose of its allies (as we will see in the 
case of Sudan and Darfur), China is also concerned about its status and image in the 
international community (as is manifested in China’s diplomatic maneuvering on the 
Darfur issue). At the same time, China is anxious the UN might become a ‘supra-national 
government’ under Western lead22. Therefore China remains one of the main advocates for 
the importance of the state and state sovereignty in the political world order. 
China’s growing relationship with Africa is a cause célèbre for China’s new development 
and ‘going out’ strategy but also for China’s iridescent role of being a challenge or status 
quo power to the global liberal order. 23 China’s relationship with Africa is partly guided 
by China’s concern to create an alternative to US global hegemony.24 China is presenting 
                                                 
19 Moore 2005, 95. 
20 Adornino 2010, 95. 
21 Adornino 2010, 95. 
22 Adornino 2010, 155. 
23 Taylor 2010.  
24 Taylor 2010, 188-191. 
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itself as “alternative development model for African states and leaders.”25 Likewise, 
Chinese policy of no-questions asked and the importance of sovereignty over human rights 
has challenged the attempts of the international community to enforce good governance 
practices in many African countries.26 At the same time, due to China’s economic interests, 
the entanglement of politics and business in Africa and conflict increasingly threatening 
investment, stability in Africa will be vital for China’s sustainable long-term investment in 
Africa. This will require China to pay more attention to transparency and best practice 
approaches.27  
2.2. Research Methodology 
This thesis is a qualitative work, based on an existing body of scientific books and journal 
articles from fields such as International Relations, Foreign Policy Analysis, African 
Studies, Political Geography and Geo-economics. In addition, primary sources such as 
online news platforms and online platforms of international governmental and non-
governmental organizations provide additional background information.28 
To provide a theoretical framework, IR theories are used to analyze sources of China’s 
foreign policy behavior with regards to sovereignty and the principle of non-interference. 
Through the lenses of the three main strands of IR theory, realism, liberalism and 
constructivism, the sources of China’s foreign policy are analyzed with regards to the 
impact they have on the concept of sovereignty in China’s foreign policy. To analyze the 
evolvement of these sources, the study focuses on literature on contemporary Chinese 
foreign policy, describing the development of China’s foreign policy since the 1970s when 
most of the patterns emerged that characterize today’s Chinese foreign policy. Domestic 
and International dimensions influencing these sources will be considered. For a practical 
framework, the nature and contexts of Sino-African relations will be analyzed to embed the 
previously explained sources of China’s foreign policy and to provide a greater framework 
for the ensuing case study of Sino-Sudan-South Sudan relations. Sino-Sudan relations 
                                                 
25 Taylor 2010, 193-195. 
26 Taylor 2010, 195, 198. 
27 Taylor 2010, 197. 
28 Singleton Jr. and Straits 2005, 10-11. 
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since 1985 and current changes and challenges in Sudan’s political realities with South 
Sudan’s will be used as case study to provide a practical example for the shifts in China’s 
non-interference principle but also to point out the limits of change regarding China’s 
adherence to the concept of sovereignty as foreign policy practice.  
The thesis seeks to explain why China’s foreign policy behavior in Africa, notably in 
Sudan/South Sudan, faces challenges with regards to the reconciliation of the primary 
foreign policy interests of China in Africa, notably economic development and the 
preservation of the sovereignty doctrine in the particular framework of African governance 
characterized by neo-patrimonialism. 
Units of analysis in this work are governments, states, groups of states as well as 
international organizations and international regimes of normative concepts such as 
‘sovereignty’ and ‘human rights’. 
2.3. Clarifications 
Throughout this thesis, the terms “China”, “Africa” and the “West” will be used as units of 
analysis. It is important to clarify these terms before proceeding with an analysis. 
What is “China”? China in Africa is not a monolithic block. Roughly, one can differentiate 
between three main actors from China that are involved in Sino-African relations. These 
actors have very different agendas and resources to exert influence in Africa.29 
First, the Chinese government formed by the Communist Party of China, is trying to 
establish deepening diplomatic ties with as many African countries as possible to secure its 
economic and political influence on the continent. The terms “Beijing” and CPC are used 
as synonyms to refer to the Chinese government. Secondly, there are the state owned oil 
companies, with the Chinese National Petroleum Company and Sinopec as their largest 
and most prominent representatives. Thirdly, a rising number of private entrepreneurs are 
setting up their businesses in Africa on their own risk. In addition to this, a rising number 
                                                 
29 Jiang 2009, 586. 
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of illegal migrant workers, adventurers and fortune seekers settle in Africa. Mostly the 
latter group often lacks knowledge about the particularities of Africa.30  
The term “the West” is referring to EU and US lead western powers. However, they all 
have very different relationships with China and Africa and follow their own particular 
agendas. One of the main influences on Western engagement with Africa is the rise of a 
human rights regime as major concern of civil society groups. These have a decisive 
influence in the West and pressure their governments to comply with human rights. This 
has pressured Western powers to adjust their policies in Africa accordingly, complying 
with rule of social justice, environmental concerns and transparency.31 At the same time, 
Western companies seek to stay competitive and increase profits while taking as little risks 
as possible. The technical advantages of Western oil companies compared to the Chinese 
are remarkable and decisive in the highly competitive oil market. However, China does not 
have to comply with the watchful eye of civil societies which gives it a competitive 
advantage over the West.32 
What is “Africa”? Discourses outside the African realm often tend to treat Africa as if it 
was one single country and not one massive continent with a considerable number of 
states, which again are characterized by a variety of political, cultural, social and ethnic 
identities. Asia is dealing with about 26 different countries when it comes to oil trade.  
There are very different interest groups in Africa that are affected in very different ways by 
the new scramble for African oil.33 in some of the main oil producing countries, such as 
Sudan, dictatorial governments make use of threat to secure their autocratic rule, financed 
through oil revenues and oil backed loans. They see China’s no-questions asked policy as 
an alternative to normative Western condition-bound engagement. The West has been 
pushing around African elites for a long time. Colonialism, proxy wars, ideologies, human 
rights – the West has been trying to shape Africa according to their own power interests 
and world view. 
                                                 
30 Chan 2008, 5. 
31 Jiang 2009, 106-107. 
32 Soares de Oliveira 2008, 95. 
33 Soares de Oliveira 2008, 94. 
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African elites have realized that they will need to work together to gain a stronger 
representation on the international stage, to make their concerns heard and be taken 
seriously and to start shaping their continent’s future. Pan-African interests are 
increasingly mediated through the African Union (AU – 2002), to fight impunity, to hold 
members to account and to watch over diplomatic ties. Africa’s partners increasingly need 
to argue their cases under the watchful eye of the AU. 
Last but not least, there is the general population of the diverse African countries. Opinions 
on China are not always positive amongst the general African population. In 2006, the 
Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta threatened Chinese oil companies with 
a car bomb attack.34 While the governing elites largely benefit from oil trade, China’s oil 
policy which reproduces social structures and systems of distribution in Africa, neo-
patrimonial structures impede real economic growth and the improvement of general living 
and income conditions of the general population.35 
 
                                                 
34 Taylor 2006, 954. 
35 Taylor 2006, 955-959. 
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3. International Relations Theories and Shifts in Chinese foreign policy 
 
To analyze the research question why China’s stance in non-interference has changed in 
Sudan, theory will be used to analyze why and how China’s foreign policy in general has 
changed over the past three decades with regards to non-interference. I will argue that 
China’s stance on sovereignty and non-interference has changed due to domestic changes 
and due to increasing complexities of China’s involvement in the international system. 
Both dimensions, the domestic and the international, are mutually influencing and 
reinforcing. China’s foreign policy behavior has changed and developed on several levels. 
While the principle of sovereignty in China itself changed over the past three decades, 
other dimensions such as image concerns, energy demands and economic development 
shifted China’s priorities away from sovereignty to economic security and energy security. 
I will focus on four pillars impacting upon China’s foreign policy behavior with links to 
China’s non-interference principle. When these pillars changed and priorities shifted due to 
domestic and international influences, China’s foreign policy became more flexible on the 
practice of ‘non-interference’. The sources that shape China’s practice of non-interference 
already carry the challenges and contradictions of that very same principle. China’s foreign 
policy approach in the 21st century ranges between “pragmatism and strategic behavior” to 
negotiate a path between China’s interests, identities and the norms of the international 
system. The contradictions and challenges that derive from this negotiation are reflected in 
China’s relations with Sudan and the contradictions of non-interference in China’s Sudan 
engagement. 
Until today, there has been no development of an exclusive foreign policy theory for 
China, neither in Chinese scholarly work, nor in Western academia. The analysis of 
Chinese foreign policy has been embedded in the existing strands of general IR theory. 
International relations theory developed three main branches which are considered as 
competing visions: realism, constructivism and liberalism. Realist approach view China as 
self-interested power whose politics are considered to be solely guided by the central 
government’s interest to secure resources combined with strategic interests of power 
17 
politics and “geostrategic competition with the United States”36. For instance, this view is 
supported by Morgenthau and Mearsheimer, two of the main defendants of the realist 
school. Realist approaches on China’s foreign policy are propagated in American journals 
such as the Washington Post but also prominent in the rhetoric of China’s Asian neighbors 
such as Japan. 37 
Another approach to describe foreign policy behavior in International Relations is the 
constructivist school. Constructivist theory assumes that the behavior of states in the 
international system cannot be measured solely based on material power relations, but it is 
made of the socially constructed relations that define the interactions of the actors that 
states are made of.  For instance, with regards to China’s foreign policy in general, 
constructivism can be used to explain how China’s construction of and concern about its 
image and international status influences its foreign policy behavior. Moreover, 
constructivism analyses the influence the international system as an outside actor has on 
China’s behavior in international relations. With regards to Sino-Sudan relations 
constructivists argue that China has changed its strategy in Sudan, mostly in the case of 
Darfur, to a more constructive, active engagement due to the influence of outside actors 
such as human rights activists and politicians in the United States. 38 
The third approach identified by Large is the classical liberal school. Liberalism assumes 
that an increased economic interdependence inside the international community would 
have a corrective effect and would render violence unnecessary to regulate the 
international system. The liberal stance is often used by official sources in China and 
Sudan to highlight the benefits and positive impact the economic and political relations 
between both countries have.39  
Each of the three approaches alone fail to cover all aspects of states’ behavior in 
international relations. A combination of all three of them is preferable to accurately 
describe the complex phenomena of China’s role in international relations. All three 
                                                 
36 Large 2009, 2013. 
37 Yong Deng, “Reputation and the Security Dilemma: China reactos to the China threat theory”, in: Alastair 
Ian Johnston and Robert Ross, New Directions in The Study of China’s Foreign Policy, 2006, 192-195. 
38 Large 2009, 612-613. 
39 Ibidem. 
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theoretical approaches are needed to understand the principle of non-interference and the 
challenges China faces in its approach to position itself in international relations. The 
following four elements shape China’s evolving foreign policy as reemerging power in the 
international system bear traces of all three theoretical approaches to International 
Relations. 
3.1. Image and International Status - “China threat theory” and China’s “Peaceful Rise” 
Image concerns and international status have an important impact on China’s foreign 
policy strategies.40 The case of Sudan, most importantly China’s shifting stance on the 
Darfur issue, can be better understood under the aspect of image concerns on the part of 
China. 
Realist approaches serve as the theoretical background for the “China threat theory”.41 This 
theory model42, promoted by right wing circles in the United States, is based on the 
assumption that China’s rise is a potential economic, ideological and strategic threat to US 
and Western interests and security.43 According to the supporters of the China threat 
theory, China pairs its ambition to regain its former imperial splendor with its recent rapid 
economic growth to challenge the position of the West in today’s global order. On the 
ideological level, China would try to spread its communist dictatorship, which is 
irreconcilable with the American ideals of freedom and liberal democracy. China’s attempt 
to spread its ideology was proven by the reckless expansionist policy China displays, as 
well as China’s growing nationalism and anti-American propaganda. Supporters of the 
China threat theory also dismiss any potential change in China’s attitude through stronger 
economic ties and interdependence. On the contrary, they believe that China’s economic 
and military power will soon bring them in the position to threaten peace and security in 
the world. Moreover, the China threat theory describes a military and strategy scenario 
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where China is preparing to replace the US as major power. In addition to this, the China 
threat theory assumes that China is a threat to the US and its allies due to the fact that 
China views them as a threat and will take actions accordingly.44 “China threat” has also 
been explained through constructivist lenses. Scholars have argued that China’s imperial 
identity and past will inevitably lead to the wish to restore its past power and glory. 
The “China threat theory” is a simplistic black and white description of the current realities 
of China’s reemergence as a superpower. It is an undisputed fact that China is on its way to 
return to the status of a superpower. China is indeed on the way to become one of the 
strongest economic forces in the world. With a constant economic growth rate of 8% over 
the last 20 years, China is now the 2nd largest economy in the global economic order. With 
a GDP of US$ 9 trillion in 2013, it was only outbid by the US with a GDP of US$ 16.2 
trillion.45 However, this will not inevitably cause conflict with the US, its allies or with 
China’s Asian neighbors. To the contrary, China’s economic and political integration in the 
global world order can have completely opposite effects. China’s entry in the WTO in 
2001 forced the new member to accept WTO rules and regulations. China’s membership in 
the WTO will open the markets of both powers for each other and introduce liberalization 
dynamics to the Chinese economy.46  While China indeed modernized its army and 
drastically increased its military budget, this budget is still significantly smaller than US 
spending in the same sector. Likewise, in terms of arms sales agreements, with a total of 
US$ 2.1 billion in 201147, China ranks far behind the US with 2011 arms sales agreements 
worth US$ 66.3 billion.48 The US often accuses China they were selling arms to 
questionable regimes in Africa. However, China is not the main exporter of weaponry to 
undemocratic regimes and conflict torn African countries. Norwegian researchers from the 
Norwegian University of Science and Technology have published a study in 2011 that 
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identified the U.S as main seller of armory and military equipment to dictatorial regimes in 
Africa.49  
3.2. The Chinese reaction to the “China threat theory” 
The “China threat theory” was reviewed in China with mixed feelings. On the one hand, it 
played into the hands of those on China who were already critical of the US and the West. 
On the other hand, it raised concerns amongst Chinese officials how this image could be 
revised.50 Not only Chinese scholarships has been dedicated in the past two decades to 
object to the “China threat theory” but it has also influenced China’s foreign policy 
behavior to counter the negative image by demonstrating the willingness for a cooperative 
and responsible participation in the international community.51 
China’s official rhetoric and policy in reaction to the China threat theory started in the mid-
90ies. The first official response dates back to 1995, about three years after the surge of the 
“China threat theory”. China sent delegations and representatives of military and civil 
sector to contradict to the theory. The points raised against the theory are separated into the 
three categories that the theory is hinting at. The response to allegations of economic threat 
applies a “blame the game, not the players”52 strategy. Officials emphasize that China is 
still a developing country and needs to comply to rules and principles of competitiveness 
on the world market to be able to catch up with their economic development. The security 
concerns raised in the theory are dismissed by Beijing as obstruction attempts and Cold 
War behavior of the West trying to create a China threat scenario to hide its own 
ambitions.53 To refute allegations of threat by China’s military, Beijing reminds of the 
relatively small strength and size of Chinese military capabilities which are solely 
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entertained for China’s international right of self-protection. Officials also remind their 
critics of the historically peaceful nature of China and the Confucian culture.54 
Moreover, China made several attempts on a practical and strategic level of foreign 
relations to controvert threat allegations. These changes and developments show the 
importance of image concerns for the development of Chinese foreign relations. Image 
concerns have a significant impact on China’s foreign policy development.55 Deng 
emphasizes that “[…] seeking legitimate power has fundamentally defined the 
motivational structure in Chinese foreign policy. Both the timing and substance of the 
systematic set of shifts in Chinese foreign policy suggest a clear linkage of its strategic 
choice to a concern over the China threat theory.”56 
According to Chinese officials, the Chinese accession to the WTO was mainly influenced 
by the goal to turn “China threat” into a “China opportunity” theory.57 Even though China 
had to comply with WTO rules and had to endure fierce negotiations over rules and 
regulations, China saw the membership to the WTO as opportunity to deepen multilateral 
cooperation and to prove the opportunities instead of threat a rising China would pose for 
the international community.58 
Another practical impact image concerns had on Chinese foreign policy strategies was the 
endorsement of the “Peaceful Rise” (heping jueqi) concept. Brought up by Zheng Bijan in 
200359, an intellectual working inside the CCP, heping jueqi encompassed the ideas of 
mutual respect, the respect of sovereignty and peaceful development. In this sense, it is a 
variation of the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” and practices and rhetoric from 
previous leaders such as Deng Xaoping. In March 2004, Chinese Premier Minister Hu 
Jintao substantiated the meaning of “Peaceful rise” by four key elements: 1) the use of 
world peace to promote China’s development while protecting world peace through 
                                                 
54 Ibid., 200. 
55 Ibid., 200-201. 
56 Deng, 201. 
57 Ibid. 201. 
58 Ibidem. 
59 Bijian was not the first to come up with the concept, though. It was previously discussed by intellectuals 
and academia. 
22 
China’s development, 2) China’s own strength and hard work as basis of heping jequi, 3), 
the duration of “Peaceful Rise” over several generations and 4) the successful reach of 
heping jequi without threat to any other nation or at the expense of interests of any other 
nation.60  
“Peaceful rise” did not make a career as it was dropped again in 2004. The Chinese 
government considered it impossible to apply in practice with regards to China’s domestic 
and international aspirations.61  Scholars and politicians soon found the concept to be 
irreconcilable with the political crisis surrounding Taiwan’s move for independence. U.S. 
interference in the issue made it strategically impossible to realize heping jequi in practice. 
However, the underlying philosophy and the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” 
endured and with them the emphasis on sovereignty which already has deeper historic 
roots in China’s own colonial experience during the Century of Humiliation and in recent 
history with the incident on Tiananmen square in 1986 which confronted China with 
international isolation. For China, this strategy “is perhaps the only option […] to seek 
space in the international system”62. Moreover, it proves the impact of image concerns on 
Chinese foreign policy considerations.  
3.3. Non-interference and sovereignty 
In its relations to Sudan and when criticized for its no-questions-asked policy, China 
evokes the unalienable international right of sovereignty, with ‘non-interference’ as key 
element. This strategy reflects China’s sensitivity about the subject with regards to its own 
domestic experiences in past and present. For instance, China’s colonial experience during 
the Century of Humiliation, when China lost its imperial glory to British colonial 
intervention, has an important influence on China’s persistence on sovereignty.63 In 
contemporary Chinese history, the defense of sovereignty internationally reflects 
“Beijing’s sensitivity to possible outside involvement in affairs perceived by China as 
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strictly domestic matters”64. This is mostly referring to moves for independence of Taiwan 
and Tibet. China emphasizes sovereignty and non-interference in its own foreign policy to 
avoid the creation of “international precedents”65 that might be used by the West to 
interfere in these affairs. However, in reality, despite the rhetorical adherence to the 
concept, China’s sovereignty doctrine is not as adamant as it used to be in earlier decades 
of the PRC’s foreign policy strategy. 
The concept of sovereignty has a long tradition in the policy of the People’s Republic of 
China.  Until the mid 1970s, China was known to be inflexible and obstinate on the 
definition and application of sovereignty. However, from the late 1970s onwards, their 
stance on questions and practices of sovereignty shifted. In the 1980s, PRC policies 
remained mostly unchanged but the government developed “a greater emphasis on co-
operation and compromise”66 In the following decade stances on sovereignty became more 
divergent. Due to different views on sovereignty within the PRC and because of China’s 
growing involvement in multilateral organizations and increasing controversies 
surrounding China’s approach to sovereignty with the rest of the world, China’s handling 
of sovereignty has become more flexible and divergent.67 
China’s strong attachment to the principle of sovereignty is closely related to China’s own 
experiences of perceived and actual infringements on its own sovereignty, mostly by the 
U.S. Some of the most prominent examples are the issue of Taiwanese independence and 
the question of independence of Tibet.  Until today, the Taiwan and Tibet issues are main 
reasons for China’s persistent emphasis of the right to sovereignty as primary human right. 
During the late 1970s, the government of the PRC displayed a uniform stance on 
sovereignty. The government defined sovereignty as “an absolute right that cemented its 
territorial boundaries, delegitimized any attempt to divide the people residing under its 
jurisdiction, and granted China immunity from external interference in its internal 
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affairs.”68 China’s sovereignty concerns play out on four different levels: territorial 
sovereignty, jurisdictional sovereignty, internal affairs vs. the international system and 
economic sovereignty.69 
Until the end of the 1970s, China was militant and unyielding in the enforcement of its 
territorial borders, which led to violent altercations with India, the Soviet Union and 
Vietnam over border issues.  In the center of these conflicts were disputes over land and 
maritime borders which conflicted with China’s neighbors to the East and to the South. 
Jurisdictional sovereignty, defined as “the relationship between the state and the ‘peoples’ 
residing within its territorial boundaries”70 was equally enforced by militant rhetoric or 
actual use of force.  Taiwan, Tibet, Xinjiang and Hong Kong were (and remain until today) 
in the focus of China’s jurisdictional sovereignty claims. These regions are considered by 
the PRC to be “inalienable parts of China”71 therefore the people living in these regions are 
considered subjects of the PRC.72 
In the center of the sovereignty concept figures the issue of demarcations between the 
international system and the internal affairs of the state. The development of the Western 
human rights regime has challenged this demarcation profoundly. For several decades, 
China has voiced concerns over the use of western-centric human rights concepts to mask 
interference in other state’s internal affairs by the West. Until the late 1970ies, China 
consequently avoided any commitment to multilateral human rights organizations and 
refused any transgressions of the boundaries between the international system and its 
internal affairs.73 
Economic sovereignty, “the states right to regulate economic activity within the boundaries 
specified by the territorial component of sovereignty”74, has been increasingly challenged 
by the development and expansion of multilateral trade and economy related organizations 
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and co-operations such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) or the 
World Trade Organization (WTO). While globalization norms such as the opening of 
markets and economic integration became central to the international system, the Chinese 
government pursuit Mao Zedong’s principle of self-reliance from the early 1960ies to the 
late 1970s by limiting external trade and placing economic affairs in the strict authority of 
the central government.75 
While China has remained a steadfast supporter of the principle of sovereignty as central 
element for the organization of the international system, its stance on sovereignty changed, 
became more diverse and more permeable on certain issues while remaining ardent on 
others. With regards to border conflicts, since 1980s China increasingly recurred to 
diplomatic solutions to disputes over onshore territory. However, maritime territory claims, 
mostly over the South China Sea, were only settled peacefully in the early millennium. 
Meanwhile, the government remains firm over questions of jurisdictional sovereignty, thus 
causing ruptures in the international community, mostly over the independence of Taiwan 
and Tibet. In the question of Taiwan, competition with the U.S. is causing diplomatic 
quarrel in the region, while the Tibet issue is mainly followed critically by human rights 
activists. In 2008, violent military actions against peaceful protests in Tibet have caused 
international attention.  
All four contested regions are of importance for China. Therefore, changes in China’s 
stance will be limited, mostly in the question of Tibet and Taiwan. However, international 
pressure on issues is growing with the growing importance of human rights since the 
1990s. With this, the principle of non-interference, “central tenet of the authority 
component of sovereignty”76, is eroding in the international-system as a whole. While 
Chinese officials still voice concern over the legitimacy of human rights, China’s 
participation in the UN Human Rights Commission as well as in other human right treaties 
and its opening up to international monitoring shows a substantive change in China’s 
stance. Nevertheless, China has an important impact on the international system 
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concerning the preservation of the principle of economic sovereignty and non-interference 
as important practices in international politics.77  
 
3.4. Development, energy and the implications for Chinese Foreign Policy 
Development as domestic focal point of the PRC has mainly developed since 1978 and has 
had a decisive impact on Chinese foreign policy.78 China’s reemergence in Africa, the 
resource richest continent in the world, is closely related to China’s new domestic 
prerogative of economic development.79 China’s development strategy focuses on 
economic growth based on increased needs of energy, the import of raw materials and the 
export of manufactured goods. Africa is both a resource basket and a growing export 
market for China. The aim to nourish China’s growth has propelled the interest in 
economic ties and investment protection concerns of Beijing which become one of the 
main reasons for Beijing’s political relations with African countries. However, the neo-
patrimonial system of governance in Africa80, characterized by the interconnectedness of 
politics and economy often combined with problems of political legitimacy and political 
instability, increasingly involve China in African conflicts and challenge practical 
applications of Beijing’s non-interference principle. 
The shift towards China’s current development strategy occurred from 1978 onwards. One 
of the most important developments with regards to Foreign Policy was the shift from Mao 
Zedong’s principle of self-reliance to the “[e]ntry in international markets and a greater 
reliance on international division of labor.”81 China’s turn towards the international 
economy “has been one of the most successful components of its new development 
strategy since 1978.”82 China has been able to gain decisive benefits from this turn, 
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increasing its trade ratio, due to more economic diversification and the import of raw 
materials while increasing the export of manufactured goods.83 The increased inflow of 
Foreign Direct Investment due to China’s turn to the international market is a second 
important dynamic of China’s recent growth. The turn towards the international market 
had an important impact on China’s foreign policy from 1978 onwards. Beijing sought to 
“improve relations with the broadest possible range of countries.” 84 China started to apply 
a more pragmatic approach to improve relations with the U.S. and its Asian neighbors.85 
Most importantly, it encouraged China to engage in South-South cooperation with resource 
rich developing countries which are also promising destinations for increased Chinese 
exports. 
The most important feature of China’s new development strategy with regards to Foreign 
Policy is the growing need for energy. Due to its new ‘going out’ approach, China’s 
economy has seen a rapid, constant growth over the past two to three decades. This has 
been achieved through a traditional economic development strategy. This strategy is 
mainly build on high industrialization and a focus on manufacturing industries. This form 
of economic development is also based on low-labor force. Hence, it comes to the expense 
of social and environmental problems. Moreover, it requires more and more energy.  The 
political legitimization of China’s governing elite is based on economic success.86 To 
sustain its growth the country will need more energy than it can generate in its own 
country. 87 
 “Resource requirements in general and energy needs in particular, are an important 
component of China’s international relations.”88 Since the dawn of the new millennium, a 
growing need for reliable and long-term energy resource supply is dominating Chinese 
                                                 
83 Naughton 1994, 53-57. 
84 Naughton 1994, 66. 
85 Naughton 1994, 66-69. 
86 Taylor 2006, 943 
87 Jiang 2009, 588. 
88 Zha Daojiong and Shaun Breslin, “Oiling the wheels of foreign policy? Energy security and China’s 
international relations”, Shaun Breslin (ed.), Handbook of China’s International Relations, London: 
Routledge, 2010, pp. 64-75. 
28 
domestic concerns.89 Since China is not able to procure this supply from its own territory 
this has a fundamental impact on China’s foreign relations90. The dependence on outside 
resources also caused a shift in the perception of security. On the one hand, due to the 
growing energy need, China’s security prerogative shifts towards economic security and 
market strategies away from the focal point on war or diplomacy as solutions for security 
issues. On the other hand, the need to rely on foreign energy resource supplies also 
aggravates previously existing security concerns. To avoid the leverage of Western 
influence, China has turned back to old diplomatic partners in Africa, Latin America and 
the Middle East.91 
China’s quest for energy resources already began in the late 1940s when the rule of the 
CCP was established, under the motto of ‘self-sufficiency’. The CCP turned to the Soviet 
Union which not only provided oil but labor-force to build up the local oil industry, 
enabling China to reach energy self-sufficiency by 1963. But only when disproval between 
the U.S. and many developing countries opened up the market for China, the PRC was able 
to pursue energy-security. First, during the 1970s, China enhanced its economy and 
relations to its Asian neighbors through exports of oil and petroleum. This deepened the 
trade ties between China and its neighbors, enabling the development of China’s export 
oriented economy. During the 1980s, China’s oil export declined while at the same time 
domestic transportation impediments forced China to import more crude petroleum from 
Oman. Thus, China became a net-importer of oil products and crude petroleum in the 
course of the 1990s.92 
The actual promotion of energy needs to a matter of security only followed at the begin of 
the 21st century, when the volume of China’s oil imports nearly doubled in 2000, reaching 
70.2 metric tons93 This forced China “to learn how to live in a world of (complex) 
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interdependence”94 and to reevaluate their perception of security, turning away from 
military and diplomatic solutions to “realms of ‘geo-economics’.”95 
Beijing developed several strategies to find economic and market oriented solutions to its 
energy security concerns. Part of these strategies are the ‘going global’ campaign, 
diversification of sources for energy resource supply or the deepening of involvements in 
Africa and Latin America. The latter strategy has led to increased tension between China 
and the West. Often, Western companies have already blocked the main share of the oil 
market in various countries. For instance, in 2003 Chinese National Petroleum Companies 
were prevented to invest in the development of an oilfield in the Caspian Sea because the 
existing companies insisted on increasing their shares. It has thus become one of China’s 
main questions to find out which energy supplies are easiest to access without facing 
competition with Western companies. One solution for China was the involvement with 
states that are considered untrustworthy by the West.96 Ties between the PRC and 
governments such as Iran, Sudan and Venezuela, who are considered as states operating 
against Western (U.S./Europe) interests and norms, have caused concerns about the nature 
of China’s resource diplomacy in the Western media and public debate. Especially Sino-
U.S. relations have come under additional strain, in connection with existing worries in the 
United States about the alleged intent of China to threaten U.S. hegemony in the global 
order. 
3.5. Chinese foreign policy in practice: Sino-African relations 
“The expansion of Chinese political and corporate interests into Africa is arguably the 
most important development for the continent since the end of the Cold War”97 China’s 
emphasis on sovereignty and non-interference is a key to its growing relations with African 
countries. After decades of Western interference and initiatives by Western organizations 
such as the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund which tied aid and 
development assistance to political and economic conditions, leaving several African 
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economies in ruins during the 1990s, suspicions and resentment against Western powers in 
Africa grew. China’s rediscovery of Africa also coincided with the rise of the human rights 
regime in the West. The Western human rights regime is increasingly accused of being too 
normative, incompatible with realities in Africa and an excuse to intervene in African 
affairs if not to gain control over Africa’s resources. China’s emphasis on economic rights 
and sovereignty as highest human rights, the shared colonial experience and China’s 
unconditional aid and trade is more in accord with many African leaders. With the 
formulation of “China’s Africa Policy” in 2006, China declared the principle of non-
interference and state sovereignty as well as the other three of the “Five Principles of 
Peaceful Coexistence” to be the corner-stones of Sino-African relations.98 
Already during the Cold War, China has been an alternative partner for the states pursuing 
non-alignment with the two conflicting powers, the Soviet Union and the United Stated. In 
turn, African countries have been diplomatically important for China already during the 
1950s and late 1960s when China itself turned its back on both powers. More importantly, 
African governments took sides with the PRC when it faced international isolation and 
embargoes following the violent suppression of peaceful protests on Tiananmen Square in 
1989.99  
China’s emerging strategic partnership with Africa100 is built on historic ties but has 
changed “into a commercial relationship.”101 In its quest for energy security and economic 
development, China has turned to Africa, the resource richest continent in the world. 
The emphasis on sovereignty and the non-interference principle is the corner stone of 
China’s reemergence in Africa. However, the particular nature of African governance is 
increasingly challenging these principles. The main challenge China is facing with regards 
to ‘non-interference’ in Africa, is the gap between the abstract theoretical concept of 
‘sovereignty’ and its actual practical applicability in the context of African governance 
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structures.102 Even though African states are obviously diverse entities with their own 
particular history and political development and one should be careful with generalizations, 
a recurring trait of African governments is a neo-patrimonial governance structure. Neo-
patrimonial power relations are built on the bureaucratic structures inherited from 
colonialism. A key element of neo-patrimonialism is clientelism, where political elites 
secure support for the exchange of goods and materials. Therefore, leaders in neo-
patrimonial structures do not rely on actual political hegemony but on control and 
patronage. To secure the support of the clients, the government needs the control over 
resources and wealth. Therefore, the struggle to control resources becomes the main 
motivation in neo-patrimonial systems. At the same time, the actual power of state rule and 
authority over territory, key elements of sovereignty, remain week and are easily 
challenged and undermined by third parties who again join in the struggle for control over 
resources. Regimes are mostly autocratic.103  
The principle of rule by a central governing authority is very similar to the understandings 
of rule in China where the state is formed by the government which itself is formed by the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Therefore, the Chinese diplomatic engagement is 
concentrated on the political leaders of their African partners. However, the underlying 
structures of the neo-patrimonial system and the challenges since is posing seems to escape 
Chinese politicians. This causes ruptures between the rhetoric concepts such as 
sovereignty, on which China builds its Africa policy and the actual practical 
operationalization of those principles.104  
The special nature of contradictions between capital accumulation through political control 
over resource and the lack of political authority of the autocratic government is the key to 
the challenges China’s non-interference policy is facing in the Sudan.105 While Khartoum 
“has concentrated political power and wealth […]”106, it fails to “maintain control over its 
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full territory […]”107. Khartoum’s authority is thus continually challenged by rebel groups, 
most notably the Susan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), causing 
continued violent conflicts in Southern Sudan, around the North-South border and, 
internationally the most prominent case, in Darfur. Khartoum’s inability to “exert effective 
control over its full territorial jurisdiction”108, as well as the resulting weakness of the 
authority of the central state have forced Chinese resource diplomacy to turn to Sudan’s 
periphery as well, most importantly Southern Sudan.109    
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4. The case of Sino-Sudan Relations: interconnectedness of politics, economic 
interests, conflict and the impact on ‘non-interference’ 
 
In the following chapter I will use the case study of China-Sudan-South Sudan relations to 
analyze why the concept of non-interference is facing difficulties in its practical 
application in Sudan amidst deepening political and economic ties, continuing conflict and 
changes in political realities due to the secession of Southern Sudan. I will first retrace the 
development of relations between Beijing and Khartoum and the deepening diplomatic ties 
between the two governments. In the second sub-chapter I will analyze the role of oil as 
vital part of China-Sudan engagement. I will point out the implications of the entanglement 
of politics and business, which is best described by the term ‘resource diplomacy’ and how 
this engaged China in conflicts over power and resources in Sudan. In the following, the 
two main challenges to China’s non-interference principle, conflict in Darfur and Southern 
Sudan secession, will be analyzed. In the last sub-chapter I will summarize the challenges 
China is facing in Sudan with regards to non-interference as laid out in the the three 
previous sub-chapters and will then discuss the limits to changes in China’s non-
interference policy.  
4.1. Political relations with Khartoum – “From the margins to a more significant 
position”110 
China has kept up relations with different Sudanese governments since Sudan’s 
independence in 1956. In 1989, the National Islamic Front (NIF)111 took over power and 
Sudan became a republic democracy. ‘Non-interference’ has been a key to Sino-Sudan 
relations. However, since the 1990s, in combination with the discovery of oil, China’s 
involvement in Sudan became “more embedded and consequential”112. China is challenged 
to reconcile their primary foreign policy principle with the growing complexities of its role 
in Sudan despite political changes and ongoing conflicts while not harming traditional ties 
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with the government in Khartoum.113 Political relations are crucial for the business ties of 
China’s companies in Sudan.  As Large and Patey argue, “[w]hat are often presented and 
thought of as essentially economic relationships are deeply, inherently political […].”114   
Until its independence in 1956, Sudan was a colony under British and Egyptian rule. After 
the end of Egyptian rule in 1956, Sudanese independence was dominated by failing 
attempts to establish liberal democracy, civil war and military coups. Since 1989, the NIF 
dictated China’s politics. With its radical Islamic policies, Sudan navigated itself into 
troubles in and outside its borders, causing its isolation in the Middle East and civil war at 
home.115 China’s relations with the NIF were encouraged by difficult domestic and foreign 
politics of Sudan and were later cemented through oil and extended trade relations.116 
China’s relations with the NIF started off cautiously, with Beijing being “uncertain about 
the NIF’s Islamist politics”117.  However, Sino-Sudanese relations were then facilitated by 
Sudan’s estrangement from the West. Due to Sudan’s support for Saddam Hussein during 
the Gulf War in 1991 it was labeled “state sponsor of terrorism”118 by the U.S, followed by 
several embargoes by the U.S. and the UN in the following years. For China, Sudan’s 
political isolation combined with the vast natural resources of the state, mostly oil, 
“rendered Sudan a strong investment opportunity”119, that was not already occupied by 
Western companies as was the case in most other African countries. For Khartoum, China 
was a welcome alternative, providing “assistance amidst protracted civil war, an American 
led containment policy and international sanctions”120 without tying its aid to any 
conditions, emphasizing principles of sovereignty, ‘non-interference’, mutual respect and 
mutual benefit.121 Moreover, Khartoum did not have the capacities to use its vast oil 
resources. With most U.S. firms dropping out of their planned investment due to U.S. 
embargoes, Khartoum needed new potent investors in their oil fields. On the domestic 
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level, civil war against the Sudan’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) restricted 
Sudan’s access to oil fields and increased the need for politically and economically reliable 
partners. At the part of the NIF, “Turning to China was a tactical move”122.  
In 1991, China resumed relations with the NIF over an $US 300 million arms deal with 
Khartoum financed by the Iran, the beginning of a series of arm trades and exports of 
armory from Beijing to Khartoum. In addition, the extension of economic ties, mostly into 
oil, brought further state visits and symbolic demonstrations of cooperation, with 
Khartoum presenting a Chinese trade fair in 1993 or Sudanese President Omar el-Bashir in 
Beijing in 1995 to negotiate an oil investment loan between China Exim Bank and Bank of 
Sudan. Thus developed “a state-supported economic engagement operating in public 
according to the principle of ‘non-interference’”123  
Sino-Sudanese relations started out as symbolic and rhetoric partnership. China’s 
unobtrusive behavior helped China to gain access to the Sudanese markets, as “the 
disparate range of actors that now constitutes ‘China’ in Sudan has moved from the 
margins to a more significant position in Sudan’s foreign relations.”124 In the official 
narrative China is entertaining ties with the NIF, traditionally based on bilateral 
government to government relations, adhering to the principle of ‘non-interference’. 125 
Regarding the practical application of Sino-Sudanese relations, “contradictions between its 
formal guiding principles […] are interwoven into wartime Sudanese politics.”126 
“The political evolution of the National Islamic Front since it seized power in 1989 has 
been central to China’s changing engagement.”127 The NIF’s goal to install political Islam 
in Sudan, “a deep authoritarianism linked to belief in the cultural superiority of those 
controlling the central state”128, has caused fierce opposition from the periphery that was 
politically and economically marginalized. This resulted in a range of violent conflicts 
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mainly led by the SPLM/A. China, approached for assistance amidst conflict, was involved 
into the conflict as Khartoum’s main sponsor and strongest political ally.129 
In 2005, after 22 years of violent conflict, Khartoum ended war with the South, realizing it 
was too expensive with little chances to decide a successful outcome while not risking 
more losses of oil revenues. After the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) which 
installed the ‘One-Country, Two Systems’ divide between North and South, China’s 
relations with Sudan continued with the previous “synergy between China’s business 
objective and the political objects of the NIF”130 Political ties are entertained by high-level 
government to government relations and corporate ties. The NCP and the CPC formalized 
their relations by a “largely symbolic”131 party-party agreement. China continues military 
cooperation, talks between high-level military delegations and arms trade with Sudan, 
supporting the NIF’s military strikes against the SPLA in Darfur. This ‘blind-eye’ support 
for the NIF caused international criticism but also concerns from circles inside Sudan 
opposed to the NIF. China’s support for Khartoum would also become an obstacle in the 
wake of relations with the future semi-autonomous GoSS after Southern secession in 2005. 
China’s relations with the NIF gained momentum with the discovery of oil, China’s heavy 
investment in the oil sector and the expanding of more diverse business ties enabled by oil 
investment. Not only does oil lie “at the heart of relations”132 between Khartoum and 
Beijing but it also enmeshed China into Sudan’s wider politics of conflict and political 
change, forcing China to reconcile its ‘non-interference’ principle with growing investment 
protection concerns. 
4.2. Trade, oil and other resources - Sudan as market and resource basket 
Scholars such as Daniel Large, Luke Patey and Padraig Carmody argue that China’s recent 
economic growth and energy security concerns have caused investment protection interests 
to become increasingly important, if not the most decisive element of China’s foreign 
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relations.133 This will inevitably cause shifts in China’s stance on non-interference, where 
economic interests are threatened. Others argue that Sudan’s share in China’s energy 
supply and economic revenue are too insignificant. They claim economic interests would 
not suffice to explain why China would sacrifice its sovereignty principle over Darfur and 
Southern secession. In this section I will argue that even though Sudan is not China’s most 
important trading partner, Sudan is still an important pillar of China’s economic strategy. 
Sudan is one element of China’s attempt to diversify its trading partners, to open up new 
markets for export and investment, to remain independent from Western oil, and to 
establish itself as powerful actor on the global oil market. China’s non-interference stance 
was initially helpful to gain access to the Sudanese market but later collided with China’s 
economic interests when oil developed into a security challenge to the region. This 
complexity of interests requires a flexible stance on non-interference in the affairs of the 
Sudanese state where security issues impact upon China’s economic interests. In this 
regard, China’s economic strategy in Sudan is exemplary for Sino-African relations in 
general. 
In 2009, China overtook the United States as Africa’s first largest trading partner in terms 
of trade volume.134 The rapid growth of trade relations between China and Africa are 
unprecedented. In 1999, the Sino-African trade value amounted to 2.00 US$ billion. In the 
next five years it rose up to almost US$ 30.00 billion.135 For 2011, China’s Ministry for 
Commerce issued a China-Africa trade volume of US$ 166 billion.136 While most 
resources from Africa still flow to Western countries, China’s rise in Africa has caused 
special attention and also anxieties over economic competition and challenges to 
hegemony in Western public and scientific discourse. 
                                                 
133 Large and Patey 2011; Large 2008; Large 2009; Carmody 2009. 
134 OECDiLibrary. „Africa's Trade Partners.“ OECD Factbook 2011-2012: Economic, Environmental and 
Social Statistics (2012): 
 http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/factbook-2011-en/04/01/05/index.html?itemId=/content/chapter/factbook-
2011-37-en, 07/19/13. 
135 Taylor 2006, 937. 
136 Zhongwei, Qin. „China-Africa Trade Hits Historic High: Report.“ ChinaDaily Online (07/05/12): 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2012-07/05/content_15551970.htm, 31/07/13. 
 
38 
Sudan is China’s 3rd largest trading partner after Angola and South Africa.137 In 2004, the 
trade volume between China and Sudan amounted to US$ 1.678.60 million, which 
constituted 13.4% of Sino-African trade in total.138 This was not even half of the amount of 
trade volume between China and its main trading partner Angola.139 However, Sudan is 
still strategically important to Sudan’s goal of diversification of trade partners to remain 
independent and conforms to China’s strategy to establish itself on the global oil market. 
China’s trade with Sudan reflects the patterns of overall trade with Africa. For instance, the 
increase in China-Sudan trade matches the overall dynamics of increasing trade with other 
African partners. Likewise, the characteristics of trade relations reflect China-Africa trade 
development in general. China imports primary commodities from Sudan, while they 
export manufactured goods to the country. From 2005-2009, 76 % of Sudan’s overall 
exports went to China, while 22 % of Chinese imports went to Sudan. The growing amount 
of exports from China to Sudan, mainly consisting of manufactured goods such as textile, 
furniture or electronic goods also reflects a general characteristic of China-Africa trade.140 
In the first decades of the 21st Century, China’s engagement in Africa, one of the 
continents with the most resources and raw materials in the world, is mainly energy driven. 
While China’s diplomatic ties with Africa are not a new phenomenon, China’s role has 
changed to the one of a resource extractor in the past two decades. This has raised 
criticisms in the West but also in Africa141 China was acting like former colonial 
powers.142 Even though China imports a variety of natural resources and raw materials 
from Africa, China’s expansion into the oil market has come into focus. China’s 
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involvement is not limited to oil rich countries. However figures show that China’s main 
trading partners, such as Angola, Nigeria or Sudan, are oil producers.143 
China pursues two main goals with its expansion into Africa’s oil industry. The short term 
goal aims at securing oil to sustain its economic growth and need for energy. The long 
term goal is to establish China as a global player on the global oil market. With this, 
Beijing seeks to avoid dependence from the global oil market. Independence from the oil 
market means independence from prices and from political and economic dependence from 
traditional Western oil powers. The long-term benefit of this strategy is more significant 
than just the short term considerations to feed the current energy need. This strategy 
explains China’s almost “aggressive” expansion into the African oil market.144 Based on 
the rhetoric of “win-win” and the non-interference principle, Beijing can neglect to address 
environmental, political issues and transparency. China often has a much easier access to 
African countries by addressing the suspicion African leaders have of Western agendas and 
Western human rights discourses. China argues that economic rights and development are 
foremost human rights. With this, it is much closer to the line of thinking of many African 
leaders.145 
Oil lies at the heart of relations between Sudan and China, but also between Sudan and 
other Asian countries such as India and Malaysia.146 While ties between Sudan and its 
Asian partners have historic roots, today’s growing complexity of their relations adds a 
whole new dimension to it. As Large and Patey argue in the Introduction to their volume 
Sudan Looks East, it was the discovery of oil and heavy Asian investment in this resource 
which then led to the expansion of all other economic ties.147  
Sudan is the sixth largest oil supplier to China after Saudi Arabia, Angola, Iran, Oman and 
Russia. Oil constitutes 90 % of Sudan’s total exports, of which 82 % go to China. China is 
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now the main investor in Sudanese oil. From 1999-2009, Sudanese oil constituted 98% of 
total Chinese exports from Sudan. However, in the same period, only 5.6 % of total oil 
China imported from Sudan went into China’s energy use, the rest went to the global 
market. Sudanese oil imports only cover less than 1 % of China’s domestic energy 
consumption. Sudan is therefore not mainly a source to secure China’s energy need but is a 
source of commercial reward and used to establish China on the global oil market. 
Likewise, Sudan’s oil market is a key investment destination for Chinese companies 
related to oil production, such as the China Material and Equipment Corporation and the 
Great Wall Drilling Company.148 This provides an economic reason why China did not quit 
relations with Sudan even when Sino-Sudan relations became a diplomatic challenge and 
policy conundrum for Beijing amidst conflict in Darfur and the independence of South 
Sudan.  
China’s integration in the Sudanese oil sector took off in the mid-1990ies, when the CNPC 
buys its first concession, Block 6149, in the Southern Kordofan region.  In late 1996, the 
CNPC acquires a major share in the Greater Nile Operating Company (GNPOC), a joint 
venture oil company which possesses the most profitable concessions in Sudan with 
Blocks 1, 2 and 4 in the Unity State, with key oil fields in Heglig. In 2000, CNPC gets a 
major share of 41% in Petrodar Operating Company (PDOC), another Sudanese oil joint 
venture with its headquarters in Khartoum operating in Block 3 and 7, situated in the 
Upper Nile State. These Blocks produce a significant amount of China’s oil exports in 
2006 after Sinopec jointed the consortium. In 2005, CNPC secured another majority share 
in Block 15, situated at the Red Sea, followed two years later by the acquisition of Block 
13. By 2002, over 6000 Chinese were employed in Sudanese oil sector for Sinopec, CNPC 
and CNPC’s subsidiaries.150  
However, China soon had to realize that their strong involvement in Sudanese oil would 
not only have benefits. Most of the oil blocks in Sudan are situated in South Sudan or 
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alongside the North-South border, while the transportation hub for Sudanese oil runs 
through the North. Consequently, China as the main investor in Sudanese oil was 
inevitably pulled into the quarrels between North and South and infected by South Sudan’s 
aspirations for independence. The growing complexity of political and economic ties with 
the central government in Khartoum causes contradictions in China’s non-interference 
policy in Sudan. The location of most of Chinese operated block would become the sights 
of violent conflict and be the objects of political disputes until today, involving China into 
the conflict, dragging it into the limelight of international protest and forcing it to 
reconsider the foreign policy key principle of non-interference. Thus, oil would become 
“[t]he most important factor through which China’s role in Sudan has contradicted tenable 
claims to non-interference”151. 
4.3. Conflict and Political Change - How ‘non-interference’ became a policy conundrum 
As described in section 3.1, traditionally China’s relations with the Sudan are strictly 
bilateral. However, a few exceptions occurred in the past few years. In the case of the 
deployment of UN/AU missions to Sudan China’s political involvement moved to a 
multilateral level. Likewise, since the CPA between North and South installed the semi-
autonomous government of the Government of Southern Sudan (GoS) and since the 
successful secession of the South in 2011, this bilateral approach was challenged again. A 
year later, renewed disproval between North and South over oil forced China again to 
negotiate on a multilateral level. China and the US where summoned by the AU to help 
negotiate the 2012 oil fee impasse between the GUS and GoSS. These exceptions 
challenged the practical application of China’s ‘non-interference’ principle. 
Darfur and the Genocide Olympics 
The conflict in Darfur posed the first major political crisis of China’s recent endeavors into 
Africa. China’s stance in the conflict changed from passive, to acknowledgement, to active 
participation in the negotiations of a solution under UN and AU assistance. Over the issue 
of Darfur, the meaning of non-interference was stretched beyond its actual meaning. 
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China, as main investor in Sudanese oil sure had reasons to have an interest in stability in 
the region due to its oil investment. However, initially, China sorted out this problem by 
supporting Khartoum with weapons and armory that was also used to protect the oil fields 
and dependencies in Darfur. Economic interests are not the only reason for China’s shift on 
the Darfur issue and the challenge of ‘non-interference’. The peak of the conflict coincided 
with a decisive event in China: the Beijing Olympics 2008 were supposed to be the 
showcase for China’s new image as modern, peaceful and open member of the 
international community. Darfur threatened to cast a cloud over the Games when Western 
human rights activists started the ‘Genocide Olympics’ campaign, accusing China of 
complicity with the atrocities committed by government backed militia in Darfur. As 
Jonathan Holslag puts it in his article “China’s diplomatic maneuvering in the question of 
Darfur”152, “Darfur […] place Beijing into a dilemma between two diverging aspects of its 
new diplomatic standards. On the one side is the traditional emphasis on sovereignty and 
non-interference […]. On the other side we find constructive engagement […] to maintain 
good relations with other world power and to play a role in multilateral organizations.”153  
In 2003, the conflict between the NIF and rebel groups such as the SPLA spread to the 
region of Darfur in the West of Sudan. The SPLA and several other rebel groups fought 
against the government supported Janjaweed militia. The NIF lead counter-insurgency 
campaign against the rebels was rigid and involved strategic attacks on villages and 
civilians that were accused by Khartoum to support the rebels. An estimated 200 000 
people were wounded or killed between 2003 and 2005. Millions of people were displaced 
and forced into refugee camps.  
China was involved in the conflict on two levels. First, China was involved on a bilateral 
level as an ally of the NIF and investor in Sudanese oil. With shares in some of the oil 
fields in the region, Chinese companies had an interest that their oil blocks and companies 
would be protected from the rebels. China also made revenues out of arms trades to 
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Khartoum. A report found most of the ammunition and small arms used in the Darfur 
conflict were connected to China.154 
Second, China was involved in the conflict on a multilateral level. Darfur had been a major 
concern of the UN. The Security Council tried several times to decide on a resolution to 
deploy troops to Darfur. In 2004, China, a Security Council member since 1971, threatened 
to use its veto power to block resolutions of the UN for an international response to the 
Darfur crisis.155 International criticism against China picked up on the issue of arms trade, 
Beijing’s neglect to use its influence in Khartoum and the reluctance to support multilateral 
missions to intervene in the conflict.156 
Nevertheless, as Brown and Sriram argue, China cannot be held legally responsible for its 
involvement in Darfur. China did not violate any international law by selling arms to 
Khartoum and using its UN veto power. It can merely be held to account morally. That was 
what human rights activists groups were aiming at with the ‘Genocide Olympics’ 
campaign.157 
In 2004, U.S. government officials labeled the situation in Darfur as ‘genocide’.158 Human 
rights activist in the United States founded the Save Darfur Coalition “to highlight 
humanitarian concerns and advocate conflict resolution.”159 Next to advocacy in the U.S., 
Save Darfur tried to gain leverage over actors linked to Sudan on the international level. 
China became a target due to its economic and political connections to Khartoum, its 
emergence as a powerful member of the international community and the public platform 
the preparations for the Olympic Games in Beijing in 2008 had gained. China’s lack of 
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attention inside and outside had already absorbed a lot of the media coverage about the 
Games. The ‘Genocide Olympics’ campaign and the Darfur issue were about to threaten 
“the positive image China had wanted to project”.160 The campaign was most successful in 
its last stages, only a few months before the Olympics were held. Save Darfur was 
successful in getting celebrities involved in the campaign. One of the most dramatic events 
occurred in February 2008, when former artistic adviser to the opening and closing 
ceremonies, Hollywood start director Steven Spielberg, resigned his position due to 
pressure by Save Darfur. However, the most decisive move was the involvement of high 
ranking U.S. politicians in the campaign who raised the possibilities of a boycott of the 
Beijing Olympics in Congress in March 2007. 161 This was reinforced, when Joseph Biden, 
then Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and 96 other members of the 
senate wrote a letter to then President Hu Jintao, urging Beijing to use its influence in 
Sudan to help solve the crisis in Darfur.  This move of the campaign to a governmental 
level had a decisive impact on Beijing, where state-to-state relations are a key element.162  
Once again, image concerns would have a decisive impact on a policy shift of China. 
Beijing’s foreign policy behavior concerning Darfur started to change in 2006 when 
Beijing started to cooperate with UN Secretary General Kofi Annan regarding the 
deployment of a UN-AU hybrid mission to Sudan163 Despite having in interest to support 
Blue Helmet intervention in Sudan due to the threats posed to China’s oil and economic 
interests, the need to maintain good relations with Khartoum dominated China’s diplomatic 
maneuvering. Therefore, China would not support a mission to Sudan without Sudanese 
President al-Bashir’s approval. Achieving Khartoum’s consent was the only legitimate way 
for China to deploy a mission and a solution that China deemed to be in accordance with 
the respect of state sovereignty.164  
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In the time frame from 2004 to 2008, China’s involvement changed from opposition to 
rather passive diplomatic involvement to active participation in negotiations with 
Khartoum.  
In 2004, the AU deployed a surveying mission to Darfur after Khartoum and some of the 
rebel groups had signed the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement. However, the AU hoped 
to get support from the UN due to a lack of financial and military assets. In January 2006, 
after Khartoum had given its agreement, the UN demanded the deployment of the United 
Nations Mission in Southern Sudan (UNMIS) to relieve the AU troops. However, China 
opposed a resolution that would enable cooperation between UNMIS and AMIS.165 
Beijing was anxious not to lose its privileged position in Sudan, neither to the U.S., nor to 
other economic competitors. It was thus in China’s interest to get involved in the 
negotiations with Khartoum to avoid the deterioration of friendly ties by Western pressure 
on Khartoum. Due to competition from other Asian suitors in Sudan, such as India, Beijing 
combined the negotiations over UN troops to Darfur with the deepening of economic and 
political ties.166 Initially, during 2006, this strategy which involved officials from politics, 
economy and military demonstrated that the PRC “was struggling to arrive at a well-
coordinated line of communication”167 regarding its negotiations over Darfur. In this time, 
China was more of a passive messenger but demonstrated more support for UN initiatives, 
giving its approval for resolutions 1663 and 1679 which prepared the transition of AMIS to 
a UN mission. China’s support for the missions and its advocacy for cooperation with 
Khartoum were encouraged by the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement on May 5, 2006 
between the Sudanese government and some of the rebels groups.168 
China’s engagement shifted to active support in late 2006. New outbreaks of violence and 
setbacks in negotiations propelled China to take a stronger stance and to put pressure on 
Khartoum to find a solution to the conflict. Amidst growing pressure on China due to the 
‘Genocide Olympics’ campaign in 2007, Beijing “sought to negotiate the terms of the 
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deployment and assisted the conception of a concrete and workable road map to achieve 
tangible progress.”169 In June 2007, the Sudanese government accepted the change of 
AMIS into a UN/AU mission. On July 31, 2007, the UN Security Council adopted 
resolution 1769. UNAMID thus became the first joint UN-AU hybrid peacekeeping 
mission.170 Many countries gave credit to China for having a major influence on the 
successful outcome of negotiations.171  
Chinese officials deny the influence the ‘Genocide Olympics’ campaign had on Beijing’s 
shifting stance on Darfur. They claim that it was “part of a program to ensure stability in 
Africa”172 in accordance with an interest in stability and economic development. Yet, the 
human rights campaign threatened China’s ascension to an influential and responsible 
member. It is in the tradition of China’s image concerns that such a campaign would 
influence China’s foreign policy making.  
Darfur introduced new geo-political dimensions to Sino-Sudanese relations. It would 
become the “defining case of China’s Africa involvement”173. At the same time, it 
developed into “a serious policy conundrum for Beijing”174. Due to threats of a boycott of 
the Olympic Games in Beijing in 2008 due to the Western human rights “Genocide 
Olympics” campaign China had to adjust its diplomacy, at least to a certain degree. China 
became a key player in negotiating the deployment of blue helmets to Darfur while at the 
same time strengthening its ties with Khartoum. However, in the case of the IFF’s arrest 
warrant against al-Bashir, China’s abstention in the voting at the UN put a shadow over 
Beijing-Khartoum relations. At the same time, when Khartoum expelled 16 NGO’s from 
Sudan after the arrest-warrant voting, China blocked the French move to annul the 
expulsion. Clearly, “China has stretched the plausible meaning of non-interference in 
Sudan […]”175, but “has also shied away from fully blocking Western initiatives to hold 
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Sudan’s leaders to account, a position not lost on the NCP.”176 Thus, China was caught in a 
“balancing act of trying to appease different, conflicting constituencies”177, forcing it to a 
“diplomatic maneuvering on the question of Darfur”178, as Jonathan Holslag calls it. 
Moreover, Carmody and Taylor point out that “movement in the issue does reflect 
flexibility in Chinese foreign policy that many observers have previously overlooked.”179 
The independence of South Sudan 
Since the 1989 coup of the NIF, rebel groups led by the Southern bound SPLM fought 
against the radical Islamist politics of the NIF. The conflict would last 22 years, the longest 
civil war in the history of modern day Africa and leave tow million people dead and 
displaced another half a million people.180 Economic interests interrelated with political 
relations with the government in Khartoum involved China in the war between NIF and 
SPLA. When political realities changed as a result of the civil war, and Sudan and South 
Sudan became separated political entities, China’s ‘non-interference’ approach was 
challenged. Despite diverging trajectories and political separation, both states will be 
connected by their main source of revenue which is also their main source of dispute: oil. 
Henceforth, China as main oil investor will be an important factor in the success of future 
Sudan’s and South Sudan’s coexistence. 
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement formally ended the conflict between North and 
South in 2005. The CPA established a two-part system for an interim period of six years 
but with the provision of a vote concerning Southern independence.  The establishment of 
the GoSS as second entity in the CPA and the independence of Southern Sudan add a new 
dimension to China’s previously strictly bilateral relations with the NIF government of 
Sudan. The ensuing dual track process between the SPLM and NCP led Government of 
National Unity (GoNU) with the capital of Khartoum and the SPLM-led Government of 
Southern Sudan (GoSS) forces China to negotiate with and mediate between two partners 
that are equally important for Chinese economic and political interests. The location of its 
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key oilfields in the South forced China to react to investment protection imperatives. Thus, 
the CPA included an economic and a political component that would be decisive for 
China’s future foreign diplomacy with Juba and Khartoum.181 
The economically important component was the separation of the oil producing and the oil 
transporting infrastructure caused by the North-South divide. The CPA included a “wealth-
sharing-provision”182 which demanded from Sudan to share oil profits with Southern 
Sudan. 
 On the political level, Khartoum’s concession to allow Southern Sudan the right to self-
determination was one of the remarkable elements of the CPA. It “enabled but also 
required”183 China and other partners to continue relations with Khartoum while forming 
new relations with the GoSS. This caused the need for Beijing to revise its diplomatic 
strategies and Sudan politics. Until this point, China had entertained “hitherto exclusive 
relations with the central state”184. The developing relations between Beijing and Juba 
from 2005 onwards were thus a notable change in China’s Sudan policy. The two-part 
system was formalized with the 2011 referendum for Southern Sudanese independence. 
Khartoum finally proved incapable of solidifying its political legitimacy and authority.185 
This will have a long-term impact on the practicalities of legal sovereignty regarding 
Beijing’s diplomatic relations with the GUS and the young GoSS.  
Initially, Southern Sudan was reluctant to form relations with China. Many in Southern 
Sudan considered China an enemy due to China’s support for the government of Khartoum 
during the North-South conflict and after.186 However, economic interests on both sides 
gave way for relations build on pragmatism, mutual need and the prospect of mutual 
benefit.187  
                                                 
181 Large 2009, 621-624. 
182 Large 2009, 621-624. 
183 Large 2009, 622. 
184 Large 2009, 621. 
185 Large 2009, 620-621. 
186 Large 2011, 157 ff. 
187 Large and Patey 2011, 24-28. 
49 
In the early years after the CPA, relations between China and the GoSS developed slowly, 
due to China’s stronger involvement in Darfur. From 2005 until 2008, relations mainly 
build on state-to-state visits between Hu Jintao and Salva Kiir, President of Southern 
Sudan and First-Vice-President of Sudan since July 2005 who took the place of former 
SPLM-leader John Garang after his unexpected death on 30 July 2005. In 2007, during a 
state visit of Kiir in China, the SPLM and CCP established links between their two parties. 
In August 2008, the Chinese consulate was opened in Juba, thus formalizing the new 
diplomatic relation between the PRC and the GoSS.188 However, China’s relations with 
Juba remain strained due to the negative effect China’s and other countries’ involvement in 
oil development has on the local population.189 After the CPA, the local population in 
Southern Sudan continued to suffer due to the spread of oil companies. Dispossession, 
unemployment, destruction of property and a lack of space for returning refugees are 
increasing discontent amongst the local population.190 In addition, China is refusing to 
assume a greater role with regards to mediation between the GUS and GoSS, creating “a 
gap in understanding between the expectations of South Sudanese and Chinese 
officials.”191 
4.4. Changes in China’s non-interference’ policy – Potentials and Limits 
Beijing has developed a more substantial role in Sudan due to deepening political ties with 
the central government of Sudan related to China’s increasing economic interest in the 
region. Through these ties, China was involved in an ongoing combination of internal 
instability, caused by the lack of state authority of the central state, and external opposition 
against the central state from the periphery due to its economic and political 
marginalization. This confronted China with the discrepancy between wealth accumulation 
through the central state and its weak state authority. Amidst the ensuing conflicts between 
the central state in the North and the South, as well as the spread of this conflict to the 
Western region, Darfur, challenged the actual applicability of China’s sovereignty concept. 
China’s relations with Africa are built on the principle of sovereignty which requires a firm 
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authority over the territorial, jurisdictional and military realm. China’s non-interference 
policy in Sudan, which formerly guaranteed good ties with the central government in 
Khartoum, thus became a policy conundrum. Threats to China’s economic interests as well 
as to its international image due to its relations with Khartoum forced China to use its 
influence on the central state amidst conflict in Darfur. Likewise, China had to revise its 
strategy to negotiate exclusively with Khartoum to pursue its business interests when 
Southern Sudan’s succession was formalized in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 
2005. These developments have contradicted observers who claimed China’s sovereignty 
stance was inflexible and unaccommodating.192  
However, sovereignty remains a key concept in China’s foreign policy, not least due to 
China’s desire not to set precedents that would allow international intervention into its own 
domestic affairs and territorial disputes. Despite a raised awareness in Beijing that business 
and politics are inseparable in Africa in general and in Sudan/South Sudan in particular, 
the shift in China’s sovereignty stance and the likelihood of an increased role of China as 
mediator between North and South in the future should not be overestimated.193 Even in 
the cases of Darfur and Southern Sudan, China bent but did not totally abandon Sudan’s 
sovereignty. 
For instance, the deployment of intervening missions to Darfur took place within the 
framework of the United Nations and the African Union. To date, China has not involved 
its troops in Sudan under its own command but always in the framework of multilateral 
actions. Most importantly, these actions only proceeded after the formal approval of the 
central government in Khartoum which was also directly involved in negotiating the terms 
of these intervening missions under AU/UN command. 
With regards to Southern Sudan, China equally made sure to safeguard the principle of 
sovereignty. First, while China rhetorically supported the continuation of a united Sudan 
after the CPA established a two-part system, it also insisted it would recognize whatever 
the decision in the referendum concerning independence of the GoSS would be. When the 
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referendum in 2011 stipulated the independence of Southern Sudan, China recognized the 
GoSS as a state the day after. While this was a change in China’s Sudan policy which had 
previously entertained exclusive relations with Khartoum, it was still in recognition of the 
authority and sovereignty of the new government in Juba. The authority of the SPLM was 
formalized by the framework of the CPA, a framework agreed upon by Khartoum and the 
SPLM. The CPA also declared the SPLM to be an official part of the central government. 
The CPA is also the framework to manage Sudan’s oil industry; The CPA gives 
obligations to the oil industry to apply best practices and help enforce the CPA. This gives 
China a legal framework that allows to bridge traditional non-interference approaches. 
However, in this regard, not only Chinese oil companies leg behind and neglect the 
responsibility given to them by the CPA.194  
The connecting element of all three states is oil production. If Beijing cares to keep oil 
production going, while Khartoum and Juba both care to keep oil revenues flowing in, the 
three states will have to find a diplomatic compromise for the future of their shared oil 
production. Further Chinese influence on both Khartoum and Juba would be vital for future 
peaceful relations. It is, after all, hard economic interests that guide China’s diplomacy in 
Sudan.  
The oil fee impasse in 2011/2012 is an indicator for a continued challenge for Beijing to 
use its influence where its own economic interests are endangered. After the independence 
of South Sudan, disputes over oil and revenue sharing continue between North and South. 
Former violent altercations continue in regions such as Southern Kordofan. In addition, 
disputes over oil and revenues are lifted to the political and diplomatic stage. On the 
diplomatic level, these disputes escalated again in 2011. Khartoum confiscated the oil that 
was transported from the Southern fields to Port Sudan in the North, accusing the GoSS to 
have failed to pay the oil transportation fee that was established in the oil revenue share 
agreement made in the CPA between GUS and GoSS. To avoid the escalation of the 
dispute and resurgence of violence between both governments, Juba and Khartoum were 
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summoned to the AU headquarter in Addis Ababa to negotiate a solution.195 China, 
together with the US, had an important impact in the successful conclusion of the oil fee 
impasse negotiations. China’s involvement in Sudanese oil as main investor will keep 
Beijing involved in the delicate situation between North and South Sudan as disputed over 
oil transportation has recently continued.196 However, the negotiations of the oil fee 
impasse again remained on a multilateral level and their compliance with sovereignty were 
secured through the authority of the AU and the active involvement of both Juba and 
Khartoum. 
Even if China will be using its influence on the governments of both Khartoum and Juba in 
the future, at least to a certain degree, it will be limited to its own geo-economical and 
geopolitical interests. This will hardly have a significant effect on the improvement of the 
living conditions of the average Sudanese or South Sudanese. The security improvements 
that will ensue from this will be limited to the oil rich areas. However, if necessary, oil 
companies will again support security in their own interests, i.e. if displacement and force 
will be necessary to secure oil exploitation then it will be very likely used again against the 
people who are in the way. Likewise, oil revenues are going to be unevenly distributed 
among governing elites. This will in no way improve the living standard or income of the 
average population. Similarly, even the SPLM will be guided by their dependency from the 
oil revenues. This makes them dependent from Chinese oil companies as well as from 
Sudan which is inevitable to transport the oil. In the end, those who die fighting for 
independence or fighting for its reversal are not going to be the ones benefitting from any 
arrangement made between any of the national or international governments.  Most 
importantly, the oil fee impasse negotiations have revealed the greatest weakness of South 
Sudan: oil is their main, if not their only source of revenue. This makes them particularly 
vulnerable to pressure. But mostly, it foreshadowed that South Sudan’s survival as an 
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autonomous state depends from oil, a non-sustainable resource which has already peaked 
in South Sudan and will be exhausted at a certain point in the future.  
54 
5. Conclusion 
 
The issue of China’s role in Sudan-South Sudan relations and the questions of oil and non-
interference has been one of the main topics of the 2012 China-Africa Think Tank Forum 
in Addis Ababa. Scholars from Africa, China and Europe discussed the implications, 
potentials and possible benefits of a Chinese involvement in the region.197 This 
demonstrates the importance and urgency of the matter in both China and Africa. After all, 
the shift of Beijing’s Africa policy to a more responsible engagement in Sudan can be a 
potential shift in China’s Africa policy in general. In Sudan, China’s non-interference 
doctrine proved to be more flexible. 
China’s stance on the foreign policy principle of sovereignty, with its key-element non-
interference, has changed over the past three decades and become more flexible. At the 
same time, development, economic growth and energy security have become China’s 
policy priority. The need for energy and the quest for new markets caused a deepening 
engagement with resource rich regions such as Africa. In its quest for new economic 
partners, China often neglects questions of transparency, social justice and environmental 
problems. This has put the Chinese government under increased criticism on the part of the 
West. The case of Sudan is one example for China’s ties with regimes that stand accused to 
neglect human rights. The particular nature and circumstances of Sino-Sudan relations 
have posed a challenge to China’s already changing sovereignty doctrine. China’s 
deepening economic interests in Sudanese markets, most importantly oil, and strong ties 
with the central government in Khartoum forced China to change its stance on non-
interference when conflicts threatened Chinese investment and international image. When 
political realities changed due to the secession of Southern Sudan, causing the separation 
of the oil rich regions in the South from important oil transportation hubs in the North, 
maintaining non-interference became a serious policy conundrum.  
IR theory offers three main approaches to explain the behavior of states in international 
relations: realism, liberalism and constructivism. All three strands only manage to cover 
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certain aspects of China-Sudan relations and each one fails to give a holistic insight into 
the subject. While the realist approach does not take into account the political principles 
that influence China’s Africa policy, the social constructivist approach neglects the limits 
of China’s change on the Darfur issue and the fact that the Chinese government upholds its 
relations to Khartoum and remains the main oil investor in the country. Last but not least, 
the classical liberal stance does not take into account the downsides of Chinese investment 
and the limitation of economic benefits for the ruling elite that control governance and 
resources with limited benefits for the majority.198  
The challenge of China’s non-interference in Sudan plays out on all three levels. As China 
is interested to become a global power and to counter U.S. hegemony, the developing 
world is a strong ally. To strengthen and continue its ties with countries such as Sudan is 
related to economic considerations but also guided by the quest for allies against U.S. 
hegemony. The case of Sudan has shown that China would rather accept to compromise 
with regards to its foreign policy principle then to give up its relations amidst international 
pressure. Likewise, investment protection concerns will come before sovereignty concerns 
where economic interests are threatened.  
From a liberal point of view, economic interdependence is also a reason for the challenge 
of China’s non-interference policy. Oil is the main source of revenue for Sudan and South 
Sudan. The location of the oil field in the landlocked South and the transportation facilities 
in the North cause an economic interdependence between both conflict parties which 
forces them to solve their disputes diplomatically or else risking their singular source of 
income. Similarly, China’s interest in Sudanese oil and dependence from both the oil fields 
and the transportation hub forces China to intervene in the negotiation between the conflict 
parties. 
The constructivist approach helps to understand the influence China’s identity crisis 
between its past as great power and as developing country and former colony has on the 
evolvement of China’s non-interference principle in Africa in general and in Sudan in 
particular. Initially, the emphasis on non-interference helped China to engage with the 
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NIF-led government in Sudan and the access to the Sudanese market. However, with 
China’s reemerging status as global power and the responsibilities and international 
attention that come with this status, forced the Dragon to position itself on the Darfur 
conflict. China had to use its influence in Sudan to negotiate the UN hybrid mission and 
later between the GUS and the GOSS to avoid international stigmatization and vilification.    
China’s boom in Sudan helped to open up relations with other Asian powers such as India 
and Malaysia. Beijing was thus pioneering Sudan-Asia relations and securing more trading 
partners for GUS and GoSS.199 
Relations between China and Sudan were mutually influential.200 China convinced the al-
Bashir government to allow UN mission, negotiated the oil fee impasse between GoSS and 
GUS, thus helping to solve conflict and dispute. In turn, the conflicts and political changes 
in Sudan did not only challenge China’s ‘non-interference’ policy but also encouraged 
active contradictions of the very same principle which has been used to mask “the pursuit 
of hard, realist interests.”201 
China’s presence in Africa is there to stay. Polemic accounts of China as either good or 
evil will neither give constructive insights in China-Africa relations nor will it help to 
evaluate the advantages and disadvantages China’s presence has for the continent. It will 
be vital for future relations to look into the advantages China’s presence in Africa can 
have. Western normative and liberalizing approaches have not always been for the best of 
African economies and societies, For instance, many of the notorious initiatives in Africa 
during the 1990ies, such as structural adjustment, have had negative impacts on African 
economies. They often neglected particularities of African governance, such as neo-
patrimonial structures. This raised suspicion among African leaders who accuse Western 
intervention as normative, patronizing, self-interested and untrustworthy. For a lot of them, 
the Chinese policy model based on non-interference and ‘no-questions asked’ is a welcome 
alternative. 
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Arguably, China’s involvement in Africa, based on economic interests and the no-
questions asked strategy is not only advantageous for Africa. It is reproducing existing 
social structures, playing into the hands of autocratic regimes and often, advantaging the 
already powerful while leaving behind or harming the already disadvantaged. It is also not 
reproducing social inequality but favors corrupt structures and puts a strain on the 
environment. In countries that are primarily agrarian, damages to the environment can have 
disastrous consequences and destroys the livelihood of the rural population. Chinese 
companies and government also stand accused of not only causing but also neglecting 
human rights, problems of transparency and social and environmental issues.  China is still 
a developing country and many of the shortcomings regarding those issues are caused by 
China’s development strategy. Similarly, the role of Chinese companies as newcomers in 
the oil sector is accompanied by a lack of know-how and technological disadvantage. 
However, with an increase in China’s economic abilities and resources and more 
experiences in the field of oil production in the future, Chinese companies might be able to 
improve working conditions and environmental impacts in its national and international 
economic strategy. Even in China, awareness has increased about necessary improvements 
regarding social issues, working conditions, wages, environment and transparency. China 
has also demonstrated that they are willing to pay more attention to these issues in its 
economic explorations in Africa. In Gabon, Sinopec has started to pay attention to 
environmental issues, adapting their oil extractions strategy, following protests by local 
and international NGO protests.202 In the case of China’s intervention in the Darfur issue 
China demonstrated its willingness and ability to use its influence to negotiate a way 
between Western interests and African leaders, while respecting both the authority of 
multilateral organization such as the UN and the AU and the right to sovereignty of the 
Sudanese government. Chinese investment in infrastructure has proved to be vital for the 
development of several African countries. Even though complaints about a lack of quality 
in a number of Chinese constructions remain, Chinese investment in the extension of 
infrastructure is important for economic development. Moreover, China is increasingly 
investing in agricultural projects where necessary. For instance, confronted with the 
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decline of oil in Sudan, China is investing in agricultural programs in Sudan and South 
Sudan to enhance future potential sources for its energy supply.203  
“Sudan is a defining case in China’s changing relations with Africa, and an important case 
in China’s wider international politics.”204  It has raised the question whether China will be 
able to uphold the concept of non-interference behind the background of deepening 
economic interests and political relations. In cases where China’s interests are threatened, 
non-interference can “also be regarded as a growing liability […]”205The close connections 
between politics and business in Africa and Sino-African relations contradict the statement 
that “business is business” 206which Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Zhou Wenzhong 
made with regards to its engagement in Sudan. Politics and business are increasingly 
difficult to separate in Sino-African relations. Thus, the internal affairs of Sudan in 
particular and Africa in general, become the affairs of Chinese foreign policy makers. 
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